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1 Introduction
Women’s organisations are vehicles for women to
collectively formulate and voice their demands
for rights and empowerment to their community,
society and the state. This article shows how in
the last decade women’s organisations in
Bangladesh became effective advocates of
women’s interests and empowerment by
negotiating their position and establishing their
strength and legitimacy. They were able to
further the gender justice agenda at various
levels and achieve increased recognition for
these demands, and policy changes to ensure
women’s rights.
The 1990s are perceived by women’s movements
in Bangladesh as a ‘golden age’: a time when
there was scope for raising feminist issues with
the state. The Fourth World Conference on
Women in Beijing in 1995 and the resulting
Platform for Action encouraged the state to
engage with these actors. There was increasing
recognition of such organisations as legitimate
interlocutors. In addition, the 1990s was a period
of democratic transition, which meant that
relations with the state were perhaps less
confrontational. However, the state’s attitude to
gender equity has been contradictory: at times
enacting progressive laws, yet at others being
distinctly patriarchal and acting to sustain male
advantage (Jahan 1995). The state is built on a
gender and class hierarchical structure and
patron–client relationships are still the
dominant form of social organisation (Goetz
2001; Nazneen 2008a). Further, aid dependence
and the politicisation of civil bureaucracy have
severely undermined the capacity of the state.
Almost all civil society organisations are
polarised along party lines which undermines the
capacity of the actors to articulate collective
interests (Hassan 2002; Nazneen 2008b). 
It is within this context that this article explores
how three national level women’s organisations –
Women for Women (WFW), Naripokkho (NP)
and Bangladesh Mahila Parishad (BMP) –
mobilise various constituencies, including their
own members, and negotiate with political
parties, state bureaucracy and allies in civil
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organisations are influential role models, and the
diversity of strategies they use for constituency
building and mobilising provide interesting
insights. BMP, established in 1970, is the largest
women’s organisation in Bangladesh. It has a
clear hierarchical command structure and strong
links with leftist political parties. NP is a small
organisation, formed in 1983, and committed to
promoting women’s equality to transform
existing unequal power relations. It has a
participatory style of decision-making. The
smallest of the three, WFW, was established in
1973. It mainly focuses on policy advocacy. 
Our research focused on two processes: how these
organisations create support for their cause
(‘activation of commitment’, Ryan 1992) and how
they create meaning around issues. To explore
this, a particular issue that each organisation was
mobilising around, and on which they feel to have
achieved some success, was selected. For BMP, it
was political empowerment of women, principally
how to increase the numbers of women in
political office and local government. For NP, it
was their campaign against acid violence, key to
which was efforts to change social attitudes by
working on the cultural representation of women.
For WFW, it was their mobilisation around the
implementation of the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women (CEDAW) as an instrument that
would help the women’s movement in its attempt
to make the state understand discrimination and
its impacts and reform its laws. 
The research process was reflexive, reiterative
and action-oriented. Each organisation selected
issues where they felt they were successful in
mobilising support. Open-ended interviews with
key people was a major source of data collection
complemented with documentary analysis.
Previous research on organisational history and
construction of organisational timelines helped to
contextualise these issues within the broader
societal context. Our insider status (one of us is a
member of NP and the other has connections with
both BMP and WFW) helped us to gain access,
create space for the interviewees to reflect freely,
and build an easier rapport since we were seen as
people with knowledge of the organisations and
the feminist movement. Our outsider perspective
as researchers helped us to use a different lens to
reflect on the organisations’ actions and be aware
of our own subjectivities. 
2 Packaging: ‘naming and framing’ the issues
for mobilisation
How an organisation packages or ‘names and
frames’ an issue (Gamson 1975) plays a key role
in building consensus among its members and
allies. Naming and framing is influenced by the
ideology of the organisation, the nature of its
allies and supporters, and the type of emotion the
organisation wants to evoke from its constituents
(Taylor and Rupp 1991). Packaging has an
influence over its success in building trust and
solidarity amongst its members (Tarrow 1998).
The three organisations used different tactics in
packaging their issues. The BMP framed the
debate around women’s political participation in
terms of ‘entitlement’. The emphasis for BMP’s
core constituents of members and locally elected
female representatives was that in order for
women to enjoy equal economic and social rights
they needed to participate equally in decision-
making. Barriers to women’s political
empowerment were presented as an injustice.
The emphasis on these aspects aimed to do the
following:
…[M]ake our members and women realise that unless
women have the decision-making power they will not
be able to change their position in other areas such as
economic and social… The women representatives are
aware about their rights being denied. They cannot
carry out their duties because of the discrimination
they experience at the hand of their male colleagues
and at the institutional level. It creates anger and
frustration among them about the injustice. We are
there to provide support and to create a general
awareness among women about this injustice.
(interview, BMP1, 14 July 2008)
This injustice framing was crucial in building
solidarity among members, representatives and
women in general. These particular framing
strategies were also used on other women’s
organisations and civil society as they tended to
agree with demands regarding this issue.
However, for political parties and the state, BMP
used more strategic methods by reminding them
of their manifesto promises and highlighting
gender biases within the political system. 
The results of this packaging have been mixed.
BMP has been successful in consolidating
support amongst members and, to some extent,
civil society. The campaign has evolved and
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spread: the issue is now widely recognised.
However, it has had less success with the state
and political parties. Holding the parties to
account for promises made has been difficult.
The parties do not see reneging as posing any
significant electoral risk. In addition, BMP has
been unable to address the perceived political
cost of opposition from within parties and the
potential loss of seats to other parties due to
increasing reserved seats for women.
NP wanted to frame issues around the acid
survivors’ movement in a way that would mean
the survivors’ medical treatment, rehabilitation
and justice needs are met by the state. But
gender-sensitive service delivery and justice are
not the only goals. They also wanted to create
social awareness of the crime itself and to evoke
empathy with the survivors as people. Thus, NP
framed the issue as a matter of social justice,
stressing the suffering experienced by survivors
and their family and thereby creating space for
and legitimating demands on healthcare and
legal needs, but also on crime prevention. This
framing emphasised the need to reflect on a
society which gave rise to, enabled and tolerated
such a heinous crime, whilst evoking empathy for
and protectiveness towards the survivors among
service providers. One NP activist explained: 
[O]ur target was to use emotions, and we used it to
our advantage (advantage of the survivors), we
encouraged the girls to speak out, to describe their
traumas, pains, their family. It is difficult to ignore if
you see it, if you hear it, if they are a person to you.
(interview, NP2, 10 September 2008) 
Another reason for using this strategy was to
circumvent the judgments made by these service
providers about the moral character of the
survivors (usually young women). This was
particularly useful in court where these issues
were raised by the defence. One NP member
detailed her strategy:
If I had tried to challenge society’s views about who a
good girl is I would have hit a wall! Instead I tried to
use emotions. I argued that whether one was involved
did not mean that she deserved to have acid thrown at
her. Her misdemeanour does not match the treatment
she received. That the defendant’s lawyer who is like
her father/brother… should not be making such dirty
insinuations... (interview, NP3, 14 September
2008)
Since the stress was on evoking empathy for the
survivors, NP did not confront the social
definition of the acceptable behaviour of a ‘good
girl’. Issues around adolescent romance and
sexuality were explored with the survivors in
‘safe’ environments, not necessarily in the public
domain (interview, NP4, 2 December 2008).
However, NP did try to link the decision of a
young woman to say no to a romantic proposal or
the right to end a relationship to issues around
bodily integrity and reproductive rights. This was
raised during rallies and meetings held on
International Women’s Day and at other forums.
The slogan used was ‘Shorir amar, shidhanto amar’
(My Body, My Choice). 
WFW chose to frame the full ratification and
implementation of CEDAW as a ‘bill of rights for
women’ for its key civil society constituents
(interview, WFW1, 30 July 2008). The different
articles of CEDAW were linked to different
articles of the Beijing Platform for Action (PFA),
in order to contextualise and illustrate the
nature of discrimination faced by women. This
helped to concretise the issue at the grassroots
level. A WFW member explained the process:
[W]e worked on CEDAW, where it came from, what
does it say, how would women benefit. We went to the
field. The first question we got was ‘What is
CEDAW?’ We started by saying it was a dalil (legal
document), and they thought it was a deed for land!
So we decided to link it to women’s rights issues, to
the PFA… (interview, WFW3, 30 July 2008)
When presenting to the state, WFW deliberately
chose to take a ‘legalistic’ approach in framing the
issue. This was to avoid any accusations of being
anti-Islamic and to create space for negotiation.
The full ratification of CEDAW and the obligation
to ensure gender equality were presented as
mandatory since the state is a signatory to the
Convention. A WFW member observed:
Our arguments are not based on emotions and nor are
they targeted to evoke any emotional response, but to
convince a person through logical argument…Our
examples show how the religious personal laws can be
discriminatory; why the government is accountable
under CEDAW to address gender inequality… We
used the Constitution to argue our case… we
approached the government/state diplomatically,
keeping the pressure on, because of the conservative
elements… (interview, WFW1, 30 July 2008)
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WFW was able to keep pressure on the
bureaucrats until the early 2000s, without
incurring any backlash from fundamentalist
quarters. Personal connections may have
influenced this. However, the stress on the state
being under international legal obligation and on
secularism have limited this issue to concerned
women’s groups, particular state officials, and
certain sections of civil society. It has not been
accepted by any of the political parties as a
mainstream issue, neither has it been included
in the wider civil society arena.
The organisations were successful in creating
solidarity and support amongst their allies and
other civil society groups due to only ‘like-minded’
groups being approached and packaging the issues
in an uncontroversial manner. In negotiating with
the state, the strategies helped the organisations
avoid controversy and afforded them access,
particularly as officials saw the issues as
worthwhile and unthreatening. However, the
‘packaging’ strategies have had limited impact on
creating space for a ‘women’s agenda’ within the
political parties. This is largely due to these issues
remaining costly to address politically. 
3 Alliance-building with civil society:
reciprocity, legitimacy and hierarchy 
The three organisations created alliances with civil
society organisations, particularly women’s
organisations, as a means of building support for
their issue, and strengthening the case that they
were advocating, thus increasing pressure on the
state. In the context of a polarised civil society
alliance-building is risky. The legitimacy of an
organisation to form an alliance and bring
together a group of organisations around a specific
issue has to be established, and is affected by
whom it includes as an ally. An unspoken but
implicit principle for alliances is that of reciprocity.
Yet certain organisations have more weight
through greater resources in terms of information,
connections, mobilisation potential, visibility, etc.
than others. These factors create tensions.
In the case of NP’s movement against acid
violence several types of alliances were formed,
although not consciously created by NP. The
most formal alliance has been the Acid Survivors
Foundation (ASF). The main objective was to
bring together the organisations working to
combat acid violence while coordinating and
bringing together services and advocacy acid
survivors needed. NP decided that the role of
service provision was not part of its mandate but
wished to ensure that an advocacy platform be
built around this. There were mixed views
around the role the ASF would play, and NP was
left feeling sidelined in the design and running
of the Foundation, despite being one of its
initiators. NP members and volunteers also
promoted the building of networks among
survivors, the main objective being to contribute
to their sense of empowerment and facilitating
the transition from being victims to being
survivors. This networking continues.
Strategic alliances were created with the media
to ensure more positive coverage. Although first
attracted by the news value and sensationalism
of the issue, some media institutions became
genuinely committed to combating acid violence.
Prothom Alo, a national daily newspaper, has since
created a fund from which they make regular
grants to acid survivors. Internally, NP had to
struggle with issues of how the women would be
represented and whether the sensationalisation
would objectify them, but the survivors
themselves wanted the media attention and felt
in control of the interactions. The protection NP
had wanted to give was neither needed nor
wanted! (interview, NP4, 2 December 2008).
Other alliances included those with doctors and
international organisations which served to
mobilise resources for the acid survivors. A
number of doctors, both in Bangladesh and
overseas, became committed to providing care
for the victims on a voluntary basis. This even led
to the creation of a specialised burn unit at
Dhaka Medical College Hospital. 
For BMP, the Shamajik Protirodh Committee
(SPC or Social Resistance Committee) was set
up in 2001 in response to the then electoral
violence against minorities. This then took on
the issue of women’s political empowerment.
BMP felt that they would be stronger and less
exposed to backlash if they were joined by other
organisations. These alliances were seen as
instrumental and context specific. A BMP
member said, ‘If a strong democratic
government were to come along then slowly this
platform will dissolve… it won’t be as essential’
(interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008).
BMP recognises that there are issues on which
the SPC members respond more easily and on
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which they can have joint positions. There would
seem to be an increasing acceptance of
differences of approach. There are attempts to
negotiate, discuss and reach a common
understanding. When asked if there were
conflicts between different organisations the
response was, ‘Each organisation deals with
various issues in their own way. There are
differences’ (interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008).
However it was perceived that now the
organisations were more willing to work with
each other:
There is a greater unity among the organisations
now… There is greater maturity now and demands
are stronger... The blockages from government, i.e. not
keeping their promises, has raised people’s
awareness… The alliance between organisations, the
coalition has become much stronger. (interview,
BMP1, 14 July 2008) 
BMP has been successful in garnering media
interest in women’s political participation. The
media follow developments around the issue and
can amplify the efforts of the women’s
organisations and hold up to public scrutiny the
role the parties or the government plays or does
not play in furthering women’s interests.
WFW has formed and participated in fewer
alliances than the other two organisations. One
major exception was WFW’s outreach work with
women’s organisations during the pre- and post-
Beijing process. At national level, WFW has to
struggle to establish its identity and legitimacy
to lead on a particular issue (as do other national
level women’s organisations), but little
contestation comes from the organisations
outside Dhaka which are happy to be included in
as many alliances as possible. 
An alliance significant for their work on CEDAW
is with the Citizen’s Initiative for CEDAW which
drafted the Alternative report for the CEDAW
Committee for 2009. This enables WFW to
influence the analysis of the country context and
use the platform to lobby for the removal of
remaining reservations to CEDAW.
Lastly, while WFW has contacts in the media and
working relations with the Nari Sangabik Kendra
(Women Journalists Centre) for whom WFW has
provided training, there is disappointment that
their alliance with the media is not stronger and
that the media has not taken on a more proactive
and progressive role (interview WFW2,
16 August 2008). 
Forming alliances is a common strategy with
varied degrees of specialisation, sustainability,
institutionalisation and effectiveness. These
alliances have given the organisations additional
visibility and credibility and increased their
outreach beyond their organisational
membership to smaller and often local level
organisations. Expectations of mutual benefit
and an unspoken principle of reciprocity have
motivated members. Both NP and BMP were
conscious of differences of opinion within the
alliances and made conscious efforts to manage
and address these differences. 
4 Relations with political parties: costs of
engagement versus non-engagement 
There are divergent views in the women’s
movement about engagement with political
parties and how far they can protect their
autonomous voice. WFW and NP were similarly
dismissive of the parties and felt they had very
little to gain but everything to lose from
engagement. BMP took the opposite view and
saw the parties as allies which would espouse
their cause. Consequently, they adopted two very
different strategies to begin with but have now
converged more after the BMP’s disillusioning
experience.
In spite of the success before the 2001 elections
in getting both major parties to agree to reserved
seats for women, neither party implemented
this. The parties perceived the costs in terms of
loss of male power to be higher than any
potential benefits of ensuring women’s effective
representation. There has since been a gradual
disillusionment and a feeling of betrayal as the
various political parties have failed to deliver.
‘Now we do not attend the meetings of the two
big political parties. The nature of politics has
changed. But we now have our own politics… the
women’s movement has its own politics’
(interview, BMP3, 29 July 2008).
Strategically BMP still continues to work with
the centrist and leftist parties and is willing to
work with the party in power, trying to identify
the right people to talk to. However, there is
regret that none of the parties lives up to its
expectations. The parties that BMP members
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feel reflect their political positions are felt to be
very weak or even insignificant. 
Both NP and WFW were concerned about
credibility if they engaged with the parties. In a
polarised national context, the organisations
have had to ‘jealously guard their non-partisan
position’ (interview NP4, 2 December 2008) and
fight off party labels that have been applied to
them from time to time. 
NP consciously avoided engaging with political
parties. An interviewee pointed out that the
organisation ‘did not know how to speak the
language the politicians would understand’
(interview, NP4, 2 December 2008). They did,
however, interact with local politicians and found
it easier to engage on concrete issues rather than
with the national level party and its politics. 
WFW also acknowledged that their relationship
with political parties was weak. ‘We were unable
to use political contacts. We tried many ways
through the NGO Coalition on Beijing Plus Five
(NCBP), we arranged seminars, but never got
their support’ (interview, WFW2, 16 August
2008). There was no follow-up.
In conclusion, the organisations were all negative
about the political parties and their lack of
responsiveness and commitment to gender
equality in general and to the issues they were
pursuing. The political parties also do not seem to
consider the women’s organisations as part of their
constituency and do not feel the need to justify
their actions or lack thereof. BMP’s agenda on
political participation has become part of party
rhetoric, but there does not seem to be any real
commitment towards it. CEDAW has not entered
the political vocabulary. However, issues of violence
against women are increasingly addressed in the
documents of the parties but whether this is in
response to the women’s organisations’ demands
or to the wider social mobilisation, is not clear.
While there might have been costs of engaging
with political parties there are costs of not
engaging with them. The influencing potential of
the women’s organisations is limited and they do
not have access to the mainstream political party
agenda. In the face of the current stalemate in
relations with the parties, none of the three
organisations seem to have come up with any
new forms of engagement. 
5 Engagement with the state: opportunism or
pragmatism? 
The women’s movement in Bangladesh has
strong views about engagement with the state,
on what terms, for what purposes and also which
state. Before 1990, the debate focused on
whether engagement with an autocratic state
meant legitimising it. Now, it has shifted to how
and what types of engagement with the state can
bring about greater accountability,
responsiveness and change. 
For WFW, especially on an issue such as CEDAW,
the state plays a primary role. WFW was able to
benefit from close relations with the bureaucracy
and from the presence of their own members in
positions of influence at crucial points in time.
The argument for the full implementation of
CEDAW was based on a reference to the national
Constitution. WFW showed that it was in the
government’s interest to first ratify CEDAW,
then regularly report on it and move towards
removing the remaining reservations.
International reputation has always been
important to the government, whichever the
party in power, and the costs were perceived to
be limited since it has been able to sign such
conventions without needing to implement them.
Women’s organisations have tried to increase the
costs by using the CEDAW Committee platform
to publicly shame the government for not living
up to its promises to remove the reservations and
undertake modification of national laws to be in
conformity with CEDAW.
The rationale behind NP’s strategy to make the
state responsible for ensuring women’s rights is
sustainability: ‘Because we might be here today
as an organisation (and gone tomorrow), but the
government machineries will stay…’ (interview,
NP3, 14 September 2008). One of the
interviewees explained: ‘We were not against the
state. Our role was to enable the state. So the
issue was developing capacity’ (interview, NP3,
14 September 2008). They felt that public offices
needed to be strengthened and encouraged to
deal with cases of acid violence. An interviewee
explained: ‘We cannot create an alternative
system. We need to fix the (existing) system’
(interview, NP3, 14 September 2008). 
Invariably, influencing the government is difficult,
time-consuming and laborious. Experience has
shown that there is a big gap between policy and
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implementation and that unless there is constant
pressure, many of the legal or policy level gains
remain on paper. NP’s strategy emphasised the
creation of working relations with various levels of
the state – for example police and hospitals. A
member commented on government officials’
responsiveness to the issue of acid violence and
felt that it was much more than the organisation
had experienced before (which can be explained
by the framing of the issue) and thought that
‘active citizenship’ can lead to a qualitative
improvement in services (interview, NP4,
2 December 2008).
Coming from a political background, BMP found
it harder to engage with the state, especially
during periods when they did not approve of the
political ideology of the regime. After initial
reluctance, BMP decided to work strategically
with the state apparatus and continued to take
up opportunities to petition and lobby the state.
An interviewee explained:
…If we want to change laws then we have to go to the
‘State apparatus’. We will have to approach the PM
and ministers. We cannot avoid the state structure to
bring about such changes… (interview, BMP2,
18 July 2008)
The pressure was kept up despite their
reluctance to engage and fears of being
negatively received: ‘kanai diaichi tula, pithai
bendhaichi kula’ (‘we shut our ears with cotton and
padded our back against blows’; interview, BMP2,
18 July 2008).
BMP interviewees pointed out that the state
acknowledges them as legitimate spokespeople
for the women’s movement: ‘We are sometimes
called by the State to give our opinions on
various subjects, for example the Women’s
Development Policy’ (interview, BMP1, 14 July
2008). However, on the issue of political
empowerment the State never called BMP but
they have approached the state: 
We have worked with all the political governments. In
the last government, we were never able to meet the
Prime Minister but [met] her Law Minister. In the
AL [Awami League] government, we were able to
meet the Prime Minister. The impact in both cases
was nil. But for a demand such as ours we had to
approach the government... (interview, BMP2,
18 July 2008)
All three organisations have been able to engage
strategically and substantively with the state and
bring about various changes. They have tried to
establish state responsibilities in a number of
areas, recognising that some issues can only be
done by the state. The organisations have been
both pragmatic and opportunistic in their
engagement, and the state would seem to be
dealing with them in the same manner, calling
on them as and when needed and choosing to
ignore them when it suited them to do so.
6 Personal networks: access and sustainability
issues
Given the social and political context of
Bangladeshi society, personal networks emerged
as a key tool for all three organisations. Personal
connections, either familial or other types, create
a sense of obligation to reciprocate and evoke
trust, which are key factors in influencing people
to join and to act (Tarrow 1998). In the case of
the three organisations, these networks helped to
open up policy and organisational spaces to
present their case. 
NP used personal networks to approach the state
to overcome initial resistance in accessing state
service provision; to manage disagreements
among the service providers about NP’s role; and
to create an immediate impact on the issue.
Initially, NP’s proposal to monitor healthcare
service providers and police stations was resisted
by government employees. They feared that
monitoring could reveal failings. However, the
members’ personal relations with hospital and
police heads ensured the required permission. 
Many of the WFW members are academics and
have family or former students working within
the state bureaucracy and this created an
opportunity for them to lobby key people. A
WFW member explained:
All of us have links with the bureaucracy… [A] lot of
the government secretaries are our students. Some of
them were our juniors (studied at the same university).
Our family members work as state officials. We used
that network… If we asked for a meeting, if we made
a request… they could not just overlook it.
(interview, WFW1, 30 July 2008)
Moreover, in the 1990s when WFW started
working on CEDAW, many of the WFW members
were in key positions. This allowed them to bring
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up gender equity issues in various state forums,
build rapport with key officials and identify
obstacles. One WFW member observed:
We had the right people in the right places. They were
in strategic positions… We were in the Planning
Commission, also working in donor agencies. We were
able to bring in gender issues at different levels of
policymaking process. Since we were in key positions,
we did not face bureaucratic resistance. We could
negotiate… (interview, WFW2, 16 August 2008)
Interviewees from BMP pointed out that in
dealings with the state, personal networks are the
primary strategy that produces results. Garnering
support among the political parties was also done
on the basis of personal networks. One interviewee
explained that personal connections with party
leadership were used on a strategic basis:
We try and work with people who are progressive
within the party, whom we may have known…
(interview, BMP2, 18 July 2008) 
The presence of particular individuals within a
group determined whether BMP would ask them
for cooperation. The interviewees explained that
this selection approach was due to the partisan
nature of Bangladeshi civil society and the cost it
implies. One BMP member commented:
We do not approach groups, we approach individuals
who are progressive, who believe in women’s
empowerment... Given that a lot of the groups can be
partisan, our allies are not groups but specific persons
who we can trust… (interview, BMP2, 18 July
2008)
Undeniably, the strength of personal networks
facilitated advocacy and aided mutual reciprocity
in building alliances. It was also effective in
mobilising insiders within the state structure and
overcoming resistance within state bureaucracy.
However, it may also adversely influence
sustainability and effectiveness, if gains made in
negotiating with the state or political parties rely
on personal links with individuals; if the
individuals leave, then the organisations’
effectiveness may diminish. All interviewees
recounted instances where this has been the
case. In spite of these risks in the context of
Bangladesh this remains an effective strategy. 
7 Conclusions
Our analysis shows that strategic packaging and
engagement with supporters/allies have allowed
these organisations to establish legitimacy of
voice and space. Their strategic engagement
allowed them to promote demands for gender
justice and mobilise a wider audience than their
own membership and like-minded groups. The
fact that they were able to make opposing these
agendas difficult for other organisations shows
the strength of the constituency-building
process.
Though these organisations mobilised supporters
for different causes, their strategies in dealing
with the state, political parties and other civil
society groups were similar. It is this similarity
that draws attention to the importance of wider
contextual factors, i.e. polarised civil society,
nature of the state, etc., that influence the
decisions of organisations in movement building.
Alliance-building is not without issue; the power
asymmetries and how concerns for legitimacy
fuel the need of the larger organisations to
control the agenda-setting process indicate the
influence of these factors. Equally personal
networks, although playing a key role in
mobilising on an issue, raise questions about
sustainability. Moreover, non- or ineffective
engagement with political parties has had
certain costs in terms of reducing influence. 
The strategies used to mobilise support and build
constituencies in favour of the specific demands
has made significant contributions towards
advancing the agenda for women’s empowerment
in Bangladesh. The analysis has shown that while
doing so the women’s organisations we researched
also gained greater legitimacy and strength for
themselves as advocates of women’s interests.
Strategies for empowering women need to take
into account the role played by such organisations
as mediators and channels of women’s voice and
demands, and engage with and support them
more actively as champions of change. 
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